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Abstract: The aim of the paper is to investigate the role played 
by differences in Institutional Quality on the process of 
technology catch-up across countries. Empirical evidence shows 
how countries endowed with better institutions are those 
experiencing higher TFP growth rates, faster rates of technology 
adoption and hence being those more rapidly closing the gap 
with the frontier. Conversely, countries lacking some minimum 
institutional level are shown to diverge in the long run and not to 
catch-up. Some institutions, however, play an ambiguous role in 
the creation and adoption of technology. We find that the 
tightening of Intellectual Property Rights reduces the ability of 
followers to freely imitate technology slowing down their catch-
up rate. This negative effect is stronger the farther the countries 
are found from the frontier. Other institutional categories such as 
openness to trade, instead, benefit both leaders and followers. 
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In 1966 Richard Nelson and Edmund Phelps formalized one of the most ap-
pealing ideas in modern economic growth, that of technological catching up
across countries. The idea, which is originally due to Gerschenkron (1962),
is at the same time powerful and simple. Countries lagging behind the world
technological frontier may reduce their gap from it by simply imitating tech-
nologies discovered in leader countries. As in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997)
this happens since the cost of imitation in the follower country is usually lower
than that of innovation at the frontier. Usually it is assumed that the wider the
technology gap and the more the scope for adopting new technologies and there-
fore the higher, ultimately, the technology growth rates of the lagging country.
Crucially, however, the catch-up process is not immediate. Simply lagging be-
hind the leader is not a su¢ cient condition in order to ensure high growth and
catch-up.
Nelson and Phelps (1966), and later Abramovitz (1986) rearranged the catch-
ing up hypothesis of Gerschenkron (1962) suggesting how the rate at which the
technological gap is closed should be linked to the followers￿ability to receive
technology ￿ ows from the frontier, that is, in their particular case, a function of
each country￿ s human capital stock. More recently, the work of Benhabib and
Spiegel (1994, 2005) empirically grounded the Nelson and Phelps (1966) hy-
pothesis showing how di⁄erences in human capital stocks may help explaining
the observed di⁄erences in the speed of technology catch-up across countries.
Crucially for the motivations of our own contribution, even after accounting
for human capital di⁄erences across countries, large di⁄erentials in productivity
levels and growth rates are still observed1. Interestingly, for example, we show
how no correlation is found between a country￿ s distance from the technological
frontier and its GDP or TFP subsequent growth rates even when human capital
di⁄erences are taken into account in the computation of the gap. We believe
this is suggestive of the fact that some other variables may be fundamental,
along with human capital, in igniting and promoting TFP growth and catch-up
across countries.
In what follows we will assume how Institutional Quality di⁄erences explain,
to a large extent, the di⁄erences in the speed by which countries imitate and
adopt technologies discovered at the frontier. Hence, we build on the recent
contributions of Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001), by assuming
not only that good institutions are associated to better economic performances
but also that they represent the necessary condition for technology adoption
and catch up of follower countries.
This said, however, another recent strand of literature argue how certain
institutions which foster economic growth in developed countries may actually
1See for example, Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2001), Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997) or Caselli (2005).
2hinder the growth of least-developed ones. Acemoglu et al. (2006), Aghion et
al. (2001) or Aghion and Howitt (2005) argue how countries lagging behind the
technological frontier, and that perform technology imitation, may be better o⁄
by some non-competitive policies in the early stages of their development2.
Hence, in the present contribution, we will analyze the impact that di⁄er-
ent institutional arrangements may play on both the production of innovation
and on its di⁄usion across countries. Evidently, countries at di⁄erent develop-
ment stages are also endowed with di⁄erent economic fundamentals which, then,
shape their innovative and imitative possibilities. We try to assess which insti-
tutional arrangements are fostering innovation creation and which are, instead,
hindering technology adoption and ultimately economic growth.
Both theoretical and empirical literature have focused on the role played
by Intellectual Property Rights protection in the di⁄usion of technology across
countries. On one hand, despite the increasing consensus on the positive long-
run e⁄ect of property rights enforcement, dissensus arises when the analysis
focuses on the short and medium run e⁄ect of a tightening of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (IPRs) over countries which di⁄er in their economic development.
From a general point of view IPRs are legal mechanisms designed to represent
a barrier to the possibility of free riding and imitation of new ideas, blueprints or
technologies by agents which did not incurred in the costs of producing these in-
novations. Maskus (2000) argues how "absent such rights, economically valuable
information could be appropriated by competitive rivals". It is straightforward
to understand, therefore, how IPRs are aimed at ensuring the innovator with an
adequate monetary compensation for the investment in R&D. At the same time
IPRs work on the imitators￿side by prohibiting free imitation and, therefore,
rising the relative costs of copying new blueprints.3
Ceteris paribus within the same economy, the enforcement of IPRs implies
a trade-o⁄ between the positive incentive given to the R&D sector and the neg-
ative e⁄ect coming from an increase in the cost of imitation. Previous empirical
investigation has already pointed out the costliness of imitation. Levin et al.
(1988) and Gallini (1992), for instance, argue how "patents raise imitation costs
by about forty percentage points for both major and typical new drugs, by about
2This literature focused especially on the positive role of anticompetitive product market
regulations and on that of ￿nancial constraints on the economic growth of countries which
perform imitation in order to catch-up with the frontier. This said, however, empirical evidence
on these regards seems to be still mixed and not conclusive. See for example the works of
Gust and Marquez (2004), Conway et al. (2006), Nicoletti et al. (2003) which, di⁄erently
from Acemoglu et al. (2006) or Aghion et al. (2005, 2000) empirically point to the scenario
where pro-competitive regulations amplify the speed of technology catch-up. In the former
papers it is shown how technology adoption may be up to 25% less in countries adopting the
same product market regulation as in the most restrictive OECD country.
3Recently, moreover, Grossman and Lai (2004) analyze a North-South environment where
both regions owns an innovative sector. Among the others, their results show how, enforcing
IPRs in the South increases the gain for the North at the expenses of the South.
3thirty precentage points for major new chemical products, and by twenty-￿ve
percentage points for typical chemical products". Also, Helpman (1993) and Lai
(1998), among others, link negatively the speed of imitation to the extent by
which IPRs are enforced in the follower country.
As pointed out by Connolly and Valderrama (2005) a similar trade-o⁄ ex-
ists, on a cross-country basis, between developed countries (the innovators) and
developing ones (the imitators). Developed countries, those where virtually all
the innovation is performed, have pushed strongly for international enforcement
of IPRs while many of the developing countries have been opposing this scenario
by arguing how too tight IPRs may end up slowing down economic growth and
harming their development by reducing drastically the access to new technolo-
gies.
Ginarte and Park (1997) provide evidence of threshold levels in the e⁄ects
of IPRs on growth. Di⁄erently from them we simultaneously test the impact of
IPRs on both innovative and imitative activities on a cross section of countries
when also controlling for other institutional arrangements. Our aim is therefore
to analyze both theoretically and empirically the ambigous e⁄ect that IPRs
may have on growth through their speci￿c e⁄ects on innovation production and
imitation.
Along with IPRs, also Trade Openness has been shown in the literature to
be an important determinant of innovation and of innovation di⁄usion. More
open economies are able to discover new products more easily and then to be
able to perform much of the reverse engineering which is somehow at the basis
of technology imitation and adoption. Also, on the other hand, we expect
trade openness to be important in shaping the incentives for imitation just
because much of the imitated goods are usually sold in international markets
(and not in the imitator country). The cases of the chinese or indian economies
are educational in this sense to understand the importance that being able
to compete in international markets may play for technology imitation and
di⁄usion. On this line, also, Falvey et al. (2002) show how international trade
may be a major source of knowledge spillovers but they do not address their
impact along with that of IPRs within a technology catching up empirical model.
Noticeably, despite its importance, previous empirical literature has not yet
provided clear empirical evidence of whether (and how) di⁄erences in Institu-
tional quality (IQ from now on) play a role in the speed and di⁄usion of tech-
nology from the world frontier to the laggard countries. Among the exceptions
stand the works by Keefer and Knack (1997) and by Olson, Sarna and Swamy
(2000) who con￿ne, not without drawbacks, their study to the impact of overall
IQ on catch-up.4
4Both of them own major drawbacks which we target in our own contribution. The ￿rst
reason of concern is that these previous contributions do not properly control for simultaneity
4Hence, with our work we aim at merging two strands of literature by testing
the impact of institutional quality within the technology catching up frame-
work directly. The main question we pose here is the following: do countries
endowed with better institutions experience a faster rate of technological catch-
up than those with poor institutions? If yes, is there a particular institutional
arrangement or policy which is more willing to deliver this outcome?
From a methodological point of view we will rely on the catching-up frame-
work proposed by Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) for a variety of reasons. The
most important is that this can be easily generalized to a vast range of hy-
potheses. Secondly, this framework is parsimonious enough in the number of
variables to allow us to address the problem of endogeneity between TFP and
institutional quality quite straightforwardly.
The remainder of the paper is the following. In section 2 we review the link
between institutional quality and technology transfers by giving some example
of how good institutions may lead to faster technology adoption. In section 3
we deal with the technology catching-up model speci￿cation. Here we explore
a logistic functional form modeling the di⁄usion of technology from the fron-
tier to the followers. In particular we show how this formalization allows us to
compute the catch-up condition as a function of both the overall IQ and of the
strength by which IPRs are enforced in follower countries. In section 4 we pro-
vide the analysis of the catch-up conditions derived from the logistic theoretical
formalization we use in the model and we discuss the role played by IPRs and
by the speci￿c development stage of each country on catch-up. In section 5 we
brie￿ y review some data issues while in section 6 we provide regression results
of the technology catching-up speci￿cation. A substantial part of the paper will
be devoted to the extensions of the technology catching-up model. In section 7
we will try to assess what institutional arrangements are particularly a⁄ecting
technology ￿ ows from leader to followers are. In particular we will be looking
at the consequences on productivity growth of tightening or relaxing some poli-
cies (such as the enforcement of property rights or a country￿ s trade openness)
which previous theoretical literature has highlighted as fundamental for tech-
nology change and economic growth. In section 8 we will discuss the empirical
test of the Institutional threshold analysis. At the end some conclusions.
bias in their estimates. Instead, we employ appropriate Instrumental Variables techniques, as
it has become increasingly popular in this kind of literature, not only to control for endogeneity
of productivity w.r.t. institutions but also to address measurement errors problems. Secondly
the lack of robust data on institutional quality used previous contributions makes OLS results
questionable. Due to the lack of data, for example, previous empirical works controlled for
the impact of institutional quality on technology transfers by using end of the period values
for institutions, instead of averages for the whole period, hence de facto, not properly testing
the catching-up hypothesis.
52 From Institutional Quality to Technology Trans-
fers
Technology transfers and catch-up do not happen spontaneously. As emphasized
by Abramovitz (1986), being a laggard carries a potential for rapid advance.
This potential, however, may remain unexpressed when the recipient country
does not own the appropriate characteristics to exploit it. As pointed out by
Abramovitz (1986) and Nelson and Phelps (1966), the opportunity for rapid
growth is taken by those who own speci￿c qualities such as technical competen-
cies or political, commercial, industrial and ￿nancial developed institutions.
Hence, before turning to the model estimations we propose a simple correla-
tion test on some of the main variables we will be using throughout this work.
The variables in the correlation matrix proxy for (i) the average institutional
quality (Economic Freedom of the World index, EFW) 5, (ii) TFP gap in the
initial year6, TFP and GDP per capita annual growth rates.
Table 1 about here
The correlation between TFP and GDP per capita growth is, as expected,
very high. Also the correlation matrix reveals how countries with better institu-
tions are those which are growing faster both in terms of productivity and GDP
per capita with correlation indexes higher than 0.5 in the two cases. Of crucial
relevance for our work is, however, the relationship between productivity growth
and the technological gap with the frontier. The correlation index clearly shows
how being a follower country (lagging behind the frontier) is not a su¢ cient
condition per se in order to experience higher GDP and TFP growth rates than
other countries. The correlation between GDP or TFP growth with the initial
technology gap is, in fact, close to zero. Our empirical investigation starts from
this result with the aim of investigating the mechanisms and the determinants
that promote fast technology catch-up in follower countries. In what follows we
will suggest how institutional quality may be this promoting factor.
From a "technology catch-up" point of view there are several channels through
which di⁄erences in the quality of institutions may shape the speed and extent
of technology adoption.
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) show the existence of a high correlation be-
tween the quality of governance and economic performance over 175 countries
for the year 2000-01. Keefer and Knack (2002) link social polarization to less
5A full description of the EFW index will be given in the next sections.
6The TFP gap is expressed as the ratio of each country￿ s Total Factor Productivity to
the U.S. TFP value in the initial year. Growth accounting methodology accounts for the
contribution of human capital in the computation of the Solow residual.
6secure institutional environments and ultimately to lower output growth rates.
Institutional quality seems to be a fundamental variable de￿ning productivity
di⁄erentials across countries.
As emphasized by Falvey et al. (2002) Alcal￿ and Ciccone (2004) or Dollar
and Kraay (2003) there exists a positive relationship between good institutions,
openness to trade and growth. By trading, follower countries are actually en-
abled to do reverse engineering of the products received in their home countries.
Within an autarkic framework both the adoption and imitation of world leading
technologies may be much more di¢ cult.
Also, and maybe more importantly, a ￿rm in a follower country may decide
to imitate or adopt a new technology (and spend some resources in this process)
when it is going to be able to re-sell the adopted technology-item in interna-
tional markets. As pointed out by Helpman (1993) less developed countries own
a relative advantage in manufacturing due to the lower cost of labor. This is re-
￿ ected in the relatively lower prices of the replicas which allow follower countries
to advantageously compete in international markets. Hence, being able to freely
trade helps in setting some important economic incentives for the adoption and
implementation of new technologies in follower countries which otherwise would
be missing.
Having good institutions is also important in setting the right economic
environment for the domestic R&D sector. Parente and Prescott (2000) explain
the huge di⁄erential in productivity levels across countries by not well de￿ned
property rights and monopoly power which would raise "institutional barriers"
to the adoption of new technologies in developing countries. In the same line of
reasoning the work of Maskus (2000) and of many others which usually argue
how IPRs are institutional mechanisms which compensate (and incentivize) the
producers of innovation for incurring in this risky activity.
Organizational factors such as the incentives to start up a new business, labor
regulations, access to credit, control of diversion, property rights enforcement
and so on surely play a fundamental role in the possibility for a ￿rm to adopt
a new technology and fully exploit its potentials. A country lacking all these
institutional elements may not be able to adopt the new technology even in the
presence of a quali￿ed workforce. Bailey and Gersbach (1995) or Prescott (1998)
point out, for example, how Ford Europe, di⁄erently from Ford U.S.A, failed to
adopt the just-in-time organizational technology from Japan mainly beacuse of
the more restrictive labor and market regulations vigent in Europe. Also, they
argued how german breweries could not adopt and run the better technologies
that are used in the U.S. or Japan (but that paradoxically have been discovered
in Germany) because of explicit rules and regulations that govern the production
of beer in Germany.
Hence, many institutional aspects (from IPRs protection to Trade Openness)
are likely to play a crucial role in the di⁄usion of technology. We aim to study the
7overall impact of IQ as well as the speci￿c impact of each one of the mentioned
institutional subcategories on the process of technology creation and adoption
within the well established catching-up framework.
3 The model
We study the role played by institutional quality on the TFP catching up process
by means of a logistic model of technology di⁄usion building upon the analytical
formalization of Romer (1990) and Benhabib and Spiegel (2005).
Let us assume the world is of two countries denoted by i = 1;2 in which
1 represents the North and 2 is the South. The production function for each
country takes the usual Cobb-Douglas form as follows:
Yi(t) = K￿
i (t)[Ai(t)Ly;i(t)1￿￿] (1)
where, as in the endogenous growth model of Romer (1990), Ly;i represents
the fraction of labor used in the production of good Y in country i. Both North
and South run an innovative sector and, according to their relative possibilities
they may produce more or less innovation. The law of motion for the stock of







where Ai represents the accumulated stock of ideas (or technology). La is the
fraction of population engaged in the R&D sector producing new technologies.
The parameter ￿ captures the returns from previously accumulated technology
stocks on the change of A while ￿ captures the returns of the R&D sector in
each country. As a simplifying assumption we assume ￿ to be the same across
countries.7
Along the BGP, it can be shown that economies which only innovate grow





where n represents the growth rate of population which, for simplicity, we
assume to be the same across countries.
Crucially, the identifying assumption of our formalization is that the para-
meter ￿, the productivity of the R&D sector, changes accordingly to country-
speci￿c conditions, in our case, country speci￿c institutional quality. In partic-
ular we assume the following:
7That is, given the same amount of accumulated stock of technology in two di⁄erent
countries, the intensity of the returns stemming from it will be the same across countries. On
this see the discussion of Jones (2002) p.99.
8￿(1) = f(S1) (4)
￿(2) = f(S2) (5)
where, Si de￿nes the country speci￿c institutional quality. In this framework
the North represents the technological "leader" because ￿(1) > ￿(2) while the
South will be the "follower"8. More formally, combining eq. (4) with eq. (5)
and eq. (3) we can show the following:









g(S1) > g(S2) (8)
The intuition behind this result is rather simple. Assume, for example that
the same share of researchers is engaged in the R&D sector in the North and
in the South. Better institutional quality in the North may allow Northern
researchers to be more productive than Southern￿ s ones9. This is to say that, in
our settings, di⁄erences in IQ across countries incentivize researchers di⁄erently
determining higher returns in one country w.r.t. the other even in a situation
where the relative size of the R&D sector may be the same across countries
(even if this need not to be the case however).10
On the "incentives side" to the production of innovation, those countries
with tighter IPRs regimes will theoretically experience higher rates of innovation
production. This justi￿es the empirical evidence that the Northern countries
(the developed ones) are both the biggest innovators pushing on the technologial
frontier and the institutional leaders, while very little innovation is performed
in developing countries.
8We will use the terminology "leader" and "North" interchangeably in the rest of the paper.
The same applies to "follower" and "South".
9That is, even if La;1 = La;2 , it needs not to be the case that ￿(1) = ￿(2): Instead we
will assume below that the parameter ￿ is a function of country speci￿c institutional quality.
Hence, in the particular example above we assumed ￿(2) < ￿(1) where better incentives to
research in the North country lead to higher returns to productivity w.r.t. South.
10This reasoning is consistent with the critique made by Jones (1995) on the standard
endogenous growth model of Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992) about the "scale
e⁄ects" of R&D e⁄ort on productivity and TFP growth. If in Romer or Aghion and Howitt￿ s
settings doubling the e⁄ort in R&D also doubles the growth of producitivity, this need not to
be the case in our framework where the growth of productivity is a function of the country
institutional quality. Also, our simple modi￿cation to the standard endogenous growth model
helps to relax the counterfactual conclusion of Jones (1995) in which the TFP growth rate of
a country is ultimately only a function of the growth rate of its workforce.
9Hence, up to now we set the conditions for which the South grows slower
than the North from which it is progressively diverging due to the institutional
quality gap S1 > S2. 11
This is not the whole story however. Follower countries need not to diverge
in the long-run due to the possibility of technology adoption from the world
frontier. Let us assume, in fact, that the South is able to imitate technologies
from the North12. The growth rate of South should be then modi￿ed as follows:










As shown in eq. (6) and eq.(7) gi(Si) represents the long run growth that
the economy i would experience in the absence of technology ￿ ows. This is
assumed to depend on each country￿ s speci￿c institutional quality13. When also
we allow for technology ￿ ows from the technological frontier the growth rate of















rate of technology di⁄usion from the North to the South.
Crucially, the rate at which the technology gap is closed is, in our formal-
ization, a positive function 14 of the follower overall institutional quality. As
pointed out by Hall and Jones (1999), for example, "in addition to its direct
e⁄ects on production, a good social infrastructure may have important indirect
e⁄ects by encouraging the adoption of new ideas and new technologies as they
are invented throughout the world ". Good institutions facilitate both specializa-
tion and ￿ exibility such that imitators ￿nd it easier to adapt their organizational
processes to the new products to be produced eventually paying a lower cost for
imitation.
Additionally, countries with better institutions are usually more open to
international markets and, hence, able to do more reverse engeneering. That
11Noticeworthy, institutions are here assumed to be exogenously given. This is the usual
assumption in empirical literature such as in Keefer and Knack (1997), Barro (1997), and
many others. More likely, instead, as pointed out by Acemoglu et al. (2005), institutions are
endogenous and determined by collective choices or by the allocation of political power based
on the economic interests of powerful political lobbies. However, Acemoglu (2004) also points
out how a complete theory on the causes of institutional di⁄erences across countries is still
missing and invoked. This task, even tough of much interest, is however far beyond the scope
of the current paper.
12In order to keep the reasoning as simple as possible we eliminate the possibility that the
leader may imitate technologies from the follower as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) where
the pool of blueprints known by the South is a subset of those known by the North.
13This is also consistent with some recent empirical evidence shown by Hall and Jones
(1999), Alcal￿ and Ciccone (2002) or Dollar and Kraay (2002) which empirically show how
institutional quality plays a fundamental role in de￿ning productivity cross-country di⁄eren-
tials.
14We assume both g and c to be increasing functions.
10is, economic agents or ￿rms which operate in better institutional frameworks
are able to exploit trade-embedded technology spillover much more than others
which operate in countries with poor institutions. The formers, therefore, face
lower costs in adopting new technologies or in using the newly produced pub-
lic knowledge at the frontier. Also, having more stable economic and political
frameworks decrease the need for economic agents to spend consistent resources
in protecting themselves from activities such as thievery and squatting while it
enables them to devote these resources to productive activities such as technol-
ogy adoption.
This said, however, if the e⁄ect of overall institutional quality on productiv-
ity growth (gi(Si)) is unambigously positive, some speci￿c institutional arrange-
ments such as the enforcement of IPRs may play an ambigous role in the di⁄u-






already pointed out, in fact, IPRs regimes are implemented in order to limit the
possibility of free riding by imitators of the blueprints discovered at the frontier.
Hence, on one hand, IPRs may theoretically reduce the speed by which
technology can be imitated in the follower country. Evidence on these regards
is somehow mixed. The work by Ginarte and Park (1997) or the theoretical
formalizations by Boldrin and Levine (2005) show a non-lineal (or negative)
impact of IPRs on productivity growth.
Hence, if on one hand tighter IPRs may be harming growth because they
are distortionary and create monopoly power and unnecessary rents for the
innovators, on the other hand, they compensate the cost of innovation and may
eventually also foster technology di⁄usion by the FDI channel.
FDI are usually one of the means by which technology spills over to develop-
ing countries. Usually one of the determinants of the MNEs locational choices is
exactly the protection of their IPRs in the recipient country. Hence, it is possi-
ble that some degree of IPRs protection may be bene￿cial to imitators through
the FDI spillover channel and that the overall impact of IPRs on technology
di⁄usion may be mixed and eventually depend on the development stage of the
follower.
Since, at this stage, we are agnostic about the balance between the positive
or negative e⁄ects that IPRs may have on technology adoption we propose an
alternative interpretation of eq. (9) where the speci￿c negative e⁄ect of tighter
IPRs is made explicit in the catch-up formalization. This leads to the following
alternative speci￿cation for the growth rate of the follower:













11Here, v2 proxies for the IPRs regime applied in the South. IPRs here enter
as a cost for the follower (or better, as a barrier to free imitation) which reduces
the speed of the technology transfers from the frontier. ~ S2 is instead represent-
ing all the other institutional arrangements which are unambigously impacting
positively the speed of technology imitation.
As in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), we formalize the di⁄usion of technol-
ogy across countries by using a logistic model. Due to the way we formalize






which dampens the rate of technological di⁄usion as the distance
from the leader increases. That is, holding constant the institutional quality of
a country, if di⁄erences in technological proportions between the leader and the
follower are large, the technology di⁄usion process will be slower re￿ ecting the
di¢ culty of adopting distant and more complex technologies.
4 Cathing-up condition, overall IQ, IPRs e⁄ects
and development stage.
In order to study the conditions under which IQ (or IPRs) lead to catch-up or
divergence we de￿ne the di⁄erence between the growth rate of the follower and












= g(S2) + c(S2)(1 ￿ B) ￿ g(S1) (11)


















(1 ￿ B) ￿ g(S1) (12)





Similarly to Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) we are interested in the study the
steady state value for the technology gap between North and South, B. This is
given by the following:
B￿ =
c(S2) ￿ g(S1) + g(S2)
c(S2)
(14)
or, in the case we analyze directly the e⁄ects of IPRs (assuming that they
can slow down the rate of technology adoption) by the following:
B￿ =
c(~ S2=￿2) ￿ g(S1) + g(S2)
c(~ S2=￿2)
(15)
12Similarly to Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), from eq. (14) or eq. (15) it
is possible to derive the conditions for which the technology gap will reach a
steady state value (the "catch-up condition") and those for which divergence,
instead will be achieved. More precisely we have the followings conditions:
B￿ = ￿ B if c(S2) > g(S1) ￿ g(S2)
or conversely
~ B￿ = ￿ B if c(~ S2=￿2) > g(S1) ￿ g(S2)
and
B￿ = 0 if c(S2) = g(S1) ￿ g(S2)
or conversely
B￿ = 0 if c(~ S2=￿2) = g(S1) ￿ g(S2)
In the ￿rst (or second) case, the steady state assumes a positive value (and
therefore, catch-up is achieved) when c(S2) > g(S1) ￿ g(S2) (or c(~ S2=￿2) >
g(S1) ￿ g(S2)) while, in the third (or fourth) case if c(S2) = g(S1) ￿ g(S2) (or
c(~ S2=￿2) = g(S1) ￿ g(S2)) the value of B converges to zero15 and the follower
never catches up with the leader.
When IPRs have an univocal positive e⁄ect both on the production and
adoption of technology the result can be interpreted quite straightforwardly:
for de￿ned low levels of institutional quality, the follower country will not be
able to ￿ll the gap between its growth rate and that of the leader in their
respective innovative sectors due to their inability of exploiting the technology
catch-up possibilities. Hence, having very poor institutional levels will impede
the South to robustly imitate the leader with the overall result of continuously
falling behind and never catching up16.
The result when IPRs protection, among the other institutional arrange-
ments, is instead assumed to play an ambigous role over the production and
over the adoption of technology is somehow more complex and deserve more
analysis.
From eq. (12) we can de￿ne the condition for which the technology gap
between the leader and the follower is decreasing (the follower is catching-up










> g(S1) ￿ g(S2) (16)
15Notice here that B is only de￿ned within the <+ set. This implies that the only solution for
the steady state when c(S2) is not greater than g(S1)￿g(S2) is actually c(S2) =g(S1)￿g(S2):
16It is worth mentioning how this result is peculiar to the functional form chosen for the
di⁄usion of technology. If we chose a con￿ned exponential function in order to model tech-
nology ￿ows we would have ended up with a unique positive solution for the steady state of
B as shown in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005).
13We can see how the marginal e⁄ect of an increase in the strenght of IPRs (an
increase in the value of ￿2) will imply a reduction of the rate of catch-up (the
term on the left hand side of the disequality (16)) since the IPRs are assumed
to play as a barrier to the free imitation of technology. At the same time, a
tightening of IPRs regimes will also lead to an increase in the production of
innovation in the follower economy (an increase of g(S2) on the right hand side
of the disequality (16)17 contextually reducing the institutional gap between the
leader and the follower.
Crucially, the overall e⁄ect of strenghtening IPRs will depend on the de-
velopment stage of the follower A2=A1. It can be noticed, in fact that, as the
follower approaches the technological frontier, the negative marginal e⁄ect of an
increase in the protection of IPRs on technology di⁄usion will be less and less
important while convergence will be, instead, achieved by means of an increase
in innovation production rather than imitation.
To summarize, what we expect to see in the data is the con￿rmation of three
basic hypothesis:
￿ An overall positive e⁄ect of IQ on both the creation and di⁄usion of tech-
nology as in eq.(9)
￿ A partial negative e⁄ect of a strenghtnening of IPRs on the catch-up term
(the speed by which technology ￿ ows from the frontier to the followers)
when we, in fact, disaggregate institutional quality into speci￿c institu-
tional aspects and allow them to impact di⁄erently the creation and the
di⁄usion of technology.
￿ A relatively stronger negative e⁄ect of a tightening of IPRs on the adoption
of technology for those countries farther from the technological frontier (as
in eq.(16), "development stage hypothesis" )
￿ A positive impact of a tightening of IPRs on the creation of technology,
that is a positive partial e⁄ect on the term proxying for g(S2) also for
those countries which are "imitators" and that are lagging far from the
frontier. The e⁄ect will be however stronger the closer the imitators are
to the technology frontier.
5 Some data issues
Empirical works concerned with the explanation of cross-country productivity
di⁄erentials usually face some major data problems. These are, ￿rst of all,
due to the fact that the standard measure of productivity or technology (in
our case, Total Factor Productivity or TFP) is usually computed as a residual
17Since S2 is increasing in ￿2:
14from the observables within a speci￿ed production function18. Hence, both
the assumptions made on the functional form of the production function and
those on the variables to be inserted within it may lead, in some cases, to some
discrepancy in the TFP estimates19.
Despite these problems a growing empirical literature focused on the de-
terminants of TFP di⁄erential across countries. Within this recent empirical
literature there are the already mentioned Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), Hall
and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2001) and many others. The TFP es-
timates we use in our work in order to proxy for countries￿technology stocks
come from the paper of Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006) (BDT from now on).
The choice of using their dataset is based on several methodological issues which
we believe to be important in our context.
To start with, the authors follow the methodology of Hall and Jones (1999)
and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) to decompose output into its productive
factors and the residual. That is they use income per worker, rather than income
per capita, in measuring economic performance. It is assumed the following
production function:
Y (t) = A(t)F(K(t);H(t)) (17)
where the output Y (t) is produced by using the stock of physical capital K(t)
and human capital H(t). A(t) represents a Hicks neutral measure of productivity
or TFP. If social marginal products equal private ones and there is perfect
competition eq. (17) implies that:
a = y ￿ ￿k ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)h (18)
where lower case letters denote variables in growth rates while ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿
represent factor shares. Notice that no particular functional form is speci￿ed for
the production function such that deviations of social marginal products from
private ones may (but this need not to be the case) be captured by changes
in TFP20. Recent empirical evidence, however, seems to show how these de-
18Some other approaches follow a di⁄erent way in computing TFP. DEA approaches, for
example, compute TFP as the distance of each economy from a non-parametrically constructed
world frontier. See for example Cherchye and Moesen (2002) or Kumar and Russel (2002).
19Caselli (2005) gives a very detailed and useful review of most of the problems arising in
the context of productivity measurement. Nonetheless, even after accounting for the majority
of these issues he argues how the biggest bulk of economic growth cross-country di⁄erentials
has still to be explained by productivity (Solow-Residual) di⁄erences.
20Hall (1990), for instance, points to the fact that, under imperfect competition there exists
a gap between price and marginal costs at the ￿rm level. This, in turn, implies that an
increase in primary inputs would lead to an increase in productivity uncorrelated to shocks in
technology. Basu and Fernald (1997) argue that: ￿if ￿rms have di⁄erent markups of price over
marginal cost, or pay di⁄erent wages, then society may value resources di⁄erently in di⁄erent
uses. Reallocating resources towards highly valued uses raises aggregate productivity, without
necessarily re￿ecting changes in technology￿. Hence, under imperfect competition, there is
no need to immediately rely on technological change for an explanation of an increase in
aggregate measured productivity.
15viations may be negligible. Basu and Fernald (1997) and Basu and Kimball
(1997), present a growth accounting framework which identi￿es several non-
technological gaps between observed TFP and "pure technology". The authors￿
empirical results, however, point out how adjusted measure of technology is very
close to the usual Solow￿ s technology residual computed by using C.R.S.21.
A second important reason justifying the use of BDT dataset is the particular
care used in computing Human Capital series. The stock of Human capital per
worker is accurately computed by taking into account both a measure of average
nominal education Ed as in Barro and Lee (1993) and an average of years of
experience Ex. We argue how, due to this feature, the BDT measure of Human
capital encompasses some of the others previously used in similar empirical
literature22.
From a methodological point of view, as suggested by Benhabib and Spiegel
(2005), human capital can either be intended as a factor of production to be
inserted into the Cobb-Douglas production function (where, in that case, an
increase in H only a⁄ects the economy by its marginal product) or as a factor
enhancing technological ￿ ows across countries where its role, as in eq.(9) would
be that of increasing the rate of technology di⁄usion.
We are agnostic about what the correct interpretation of the role of human
capital stocks should actually be. It may well be the case that both human
capital stocks and institutional quality should be theoretically regarded as dis-
tinct factors enhancing technological ￿ ows across countries and therefore di-
rectly inserted into the catching up regression as a determinant of the speed of
technological convergence. However, from a purely econometric point of view,
inserting both human capital and institutions into the same regression as sepa-
rate explanatory variables explaining technology growth may create unsolvable
endogeneity problems. In particular, it is di¢ cult to assume a priori exogene-
ity of Human Capital w.r.t. Institutional Quality and, in turn, of each one of
these two variables w.r.t to productivity growth. The solution of this simultane-
ous relations would indeed need a three stage least squares estimation. Hence,
we would have to ￿nd distinct instruments for the two suspected endogenous
variables.
Crucially, not only one would have to ￿nd such instrumental sets but also
instruments would need to be orthogonal one another and not collinear. The
task seems rather di¢ cult and instruments may be very weak precluding the
possibility of correctly estimating the basic relation we want to test. Therefore
21Basu and Fernald (1997) p.7 on U.S. data. Basu and Kimball (1997) p. 16.
22We send the interested reader to Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006) for a more detailed
description of computation methodology. Some seemingly superior measures of human capital
are given by de la Fuente and DomØnech (2002). However, the short longitudinal dimension
of their dataset (only 21 OECD countries) precludes their use in this context.
16we chose to control for di⁄erences in educational levels across countries by us-
ing TFP estimates which already account for human capital stocks within the
production function as it is usually done in many other empirical works23.
Concerning the de￿nition of IQ, the institutional proxy we use come from
the Economic Freedom of the World index (EFW) elaborated by the Fraser
institute (www.fraserinstitute.ca). This is a cross-country index based on survey
data are from two annual publications: the Global Competitiveness Report and
the International Country Risk Guide.
The index measures the degree of economic freedom with 5-year span in-
tervals in between 1970 and 2000 in ￿ve major areas: (i) Size of Government:
Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises, (ii) Legal Structure and Security of Prop-
erty Rights, (iii) Access to Sound Money, (iv) Freedom to Trade Internationally
and (v) Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business. Within the ￿ve major areas,
21 components are incorporated into the index but many of those components
are themselves made up of several sub-components. Counting the various sub
components, the EFW index utilizes 38 distinct pieces of data.
This is one of the main advantages24 of using this index which provides
both (i) the overall index of each country￿ s Institutional Quality and (ii) the
disaggregated data used to compute it. Hence, it will be possible in what follows
to test which of the 5 main areas that compose the EFW are more important in
the catch up process and therefore to highlight what particular aspects of the
broader IQ index is more willing to play a role in technology ￿ ows from leader
countries to laggards.
However, due to data availability our sample size is of 50 countries for which
data are available for the years in between 1970 and 200025. This is a relatively
small number of countries. Nonetheless, the 50 countries within our sample
sum up to almost 75% of the world GDP in PPP for the years considered. We
23Hence, we do not discard the contribution of human capital di⁄erences in the process
of technology growth. These di⁄erences are considered within the estimation of TFP levels
while the e⁄ects of IQ di⁄erences will be on the speed of technology catch up. The estimation
of "human capital corrected TFP level" is nowadays almost a standard procedure. See for
instance Hall and Jones (1999), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Caselli (2005) only to
mention some.
24Another one is that, di⁄erently from other indexes, the EFW propose a chain-linked index
which is more suitable for cross-country comparison since data are consistent over time in the
sense that an estimate of institutional quality for a certain country is provided only if adjacent
years are available for the same country and sub-institutional variables. We avoid, this way,
to compute averages of institutional quality which rely on di⁄erent variables￿baskets.
25All available countries were inserted into the sample for which at least 25 years obser-
vation were available for all the main variables. Countries in our sample are: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark,
Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, Newzealand,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, United Kingdom, Usa.
17will also show how the main empirical results are invariant when we enlarge
sample size by using the institutional index of Hall and Jones (1999) for which
we have a higher number of countries but which relies on a single year estimate
of institutional quality (the year 1988) which proxies for the whole period26.
We will also show how the results hold when we restrict the sample to a smaller
pool of developing countries which more than others may be a⁄ected by the
process of technology catch-up.
6 The empirical framework
6.1 Empirical model
We use the empirical speci￿cation provided by Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) in
order to test eq. (9). This is given below in a form which nests both a logistic
(￿ = 1) and a con￿ned exponential di⁄usion of technology (￿ = ￿1):















with "i ￿ i:i:d:N(0;1). The subscript i denotes a generic follower country
within the set I denoting the whole pool of followers with i = 2;3::;F and
i 6= l. ￿ai is the average annual TFP growth rate of country i. The subscript
l represents the leader country, that is, the U.S. while ￿ si is the log average
institutional endowment of country i.
As in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) we can rearrange the catch-up condition








where ￿ sl;trepresents the log of average institutional quality of the leader. S￿
i;t
is therefore the threshold level of institutional quality that a country must own
in order to theoretically catch-up with the leader. A level of institutional quality
lower than the threshold implies, theoretically, divergence from the frontier.
26The main problem with the index proposed by Hall and Jones (1999), and which is the
reason we chose not to use it as main index for our work, is that this does not match the
time span we analyzed in our work. However, it may be argued that institutional quality
changes over time only slowly and that the analysis ran by using these data still provides a
good approximation for the hypothesis we are here testing. Moreover, the EFW index proves
to be better than the Social Infrastructure index of Hall and Jones (1999) in the fact that
it can be disaggregated into its main sub-components. This feature will be very useful in
disentangling the partial e⁄ects of di⁄erent institutional arrangements on technology ￿ows in
what will follows.
186.2 Endogeneity issues
As brie￿ y pointed out before, endogeneity between economic institutions (EFW)
and productivity is likely to arise in our context. Put it in other words, it is going
to be di¢ cult to correctly estimate the partial e⁄ect of institutional quality on
the technology catching up process since the relation between institutions and
productivity is likely to be simultaneous and su⁄er from reverse causality.
We address this problem by making use of appropriate instrumental vari-
ables estimation techniques (IV). Our choice of the instrumental set relies on
previous empirical work. The institutional quality of a country has been often
put in relation with its colonial history. In particular, Hall and Jones (1999)
and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) interestingly point out how those
regions which have been colonized by European countries are more likely to
have developed social infrastructures similar to the motherland. Assuming that
European countries have better institutional infrastructures for trade, research
(protection of IPRs) and economic growth, we may observe a positive correla-
tion between a country￿ s institutional quality and its linguistic characteristics
which proxy for the in￿ uence exerted by the motherland.
In particular it is often assumed (see Hall and Jones (1999)) that the bigger
is the fraction of a country￿ s population speaking one of the 6 major European
languages (or English) and the higher will be its institutional quality27. The
latitude of a country, on the other hand, may be providing useful information
about the kind of colonialism to which regions and countries have been exposed
to. In particular, it is argued that if a country lies on similar latitudes of major
European countries (in the range of, let us say, France, England and Spain)
this may be a signal of the presence, in those regions, of a ￿non-predatory￿
colonialism. To put it in other words, it is more likely that colonialists actu-
ally settle down in regions with similar climate conditions as the motherland
ultimately bringing with them their home-country institutions. Instead, being
located in more isolated regions and with very di⁄erent climate conditions from
the motherland may have resulted in a predatory colonialism which led to the
establishment of "extractive" poor institutions.
Also, the degree of trade openness of a country may help to judge the good-
ness of a country￿ s IQ as long as this instrument is proven to be orthogonal to
the error process in the regression. Usually, empirical works use a measure of
trade openness coming from gravity equations. Here, instead we use the mea-
sure of trade openness coming from the work of Sachs and Warner (1995) which
we will prove to be strongly orthogonal to the error process and therefore truly
exogenous28.
27Hall and Jones (1999) and many others.
28The Sachs-Warner index measures the fraction of years during the period 1950 to 1994
that the economy has been open and is measured on a [0,1] scale.One may be skeptical about
the true exogeneity of this instrument. However, we perform a C-test checking its exogeneity
￿nding this instrument to be strongly orthogonal in the IV regression with a p-value of .95.
196.3 Econometric results
We initially choose to estimate the logistic di⁄usion process of technology of
eq.(14) by imposing (rather than estimating) the coe¢ cient ￿ = 1. We give the
results in table 2.
Table 2 about here
Coe¢ cients in column (i) enter with the expected sign and are all economet-
rically robust at 1 percent con￿dence levels con￿rming how institutional quality
seems to act as an enhancing factor in the ￿ ows of technology from the leader to
the followers. The main result shows how, holding constant the distance from
the frontier, those countries endowed with better institutions are, on average,
catching up faster with the leader by means of positive (and higher) TFP growth
rates.
Also, the positive and statistical coe¢ cient on the variable capturing insti-
tutional quality alone, namely g(Si), points to the fact that, as we expected,
better institutions are the fundamental determinants for economic growth per
sŁ even outside the context of technological catch-up.
Instruments pass the standard over-ID test while, di⁄erently from what sus-
pected, we cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of institutional quality at
10% con￿dence levels. This comes somehow as a surprise. However, the fact
that institutional indexes are only a proxy of real institutions leads us to be
careful in going back to OLS estimations. In particular, as pointed out by Hall
and Jones (1999), IV estimation may be of help in solving both endogeneity
and measurement error problems so that we prefer to stick to the IV estimation
results rather than a simpler OLS estimation. From an econometric point of
view, due to the presence of heteroskedasticity signaled by the Pagan-Hall test
we make use of heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates.
To the initial speci￿cation we add control variables which are commonly used
in growth regression in order to capture ￿-type convergence mechanisms. The
insertion of these variables into our framework is of particular interests since
it allows us to empirically check whether the technology catch-up mechanisms
may be responsible for ￿-convergence detected across countries.
As a ￿rst check, hence, we run our baseline speci￿cation by dropping the
catch-up term (the interaction of institutions with the technology gap) and only
leave the variables for the initial level of log GDP per capita and investment rate
and the institutional quality of each country. Our result are strongly indicative
of ￿-convergence. The convergence is conditional to the institutional level of
each country with the coe¢ cient associated to the initial GDP being negative
and statistically signi￿cant at 1% con￿dence level.
20Crucially, we are then interested in understanding whether the observed ￿-
convergence may be actually driven by catching-up in productivity. In column
(iii) we re-insert the the interaction of institutions with the technology gap.
Results show the catch-up term to be again statistically signi￿cant and with
the expected negative sign as in the baseline speci￿cation. More interestingly,
instead, the log of initial GDP changes from a negative to a positive coe¢ cient
maintaining the same statistical signi￿cance. The result, then, points to the
fact that much of the observed ￿-convergence could be actually ascribed to
technology catch-up.
6.4 Some robustness checks
As an additional robustness check of the results obtained in the baseline speci￿-
cation we test also the con￿ned exponential speci￿cation of technology di⁄usion
by imposing ￿ = ￿129. The results are given in table 3.
Table 3 about here
Again coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant at 1 percent con￿dence inter-
vals. The coe¢ cient associated to the term ln ￿ S1970￿200 ￿(TFPi=TFPl)￿ enters
with a positive sign, as expected. That is, the larger the technological gap from
the frontier and the higher TFP growth rate of the follower. Crucially, however,
the ￿ ow of technology from leader to follower is again mediated by country spe-
ci￿c institutional quality. That is, the follwer country exploits its potential for
high growth in the presence of good institutional infrastructures which allows
it to adopt technology and innovations faster.
Another way of checking the robustness of our results is that of using alter-
native measures of institutional quality. We run the baseline speci￿cation by
exploiting di⁄erent measures of institutional quality widely used in the litera-
ture. We use both the institutional index proposed by Hall and Jones (1999)
called (i) ￿social infrastructures￿ and (ii) its sub-index, GADP (Government
Anti-Diversion Policies index).30
The correlation between the EFW index used in the baseline regression and
these other two institutional proxies is high (as expected) but not perfect. The
29Di⁄erently from the logistic formulation, here the larger the technology gap and the higher
the potential for rapid growth independently from the fact that distant technologies may be
more di¢ cult to be adopted.
30The use of these two alternative measures allows us to increase the sample size (from
50 to 97 countries) at the cost of having to use a point estimate (for the year 1988) for the
Institutiona proxy instead of using the average of the period 1970-2000 as for the EFW index
we use in the baseline speci￿cation. Moreover, the use of the Hall and Jones￿indexes required
to use a di⁄erent instrument (the log of Frankel and Romer trade predicted share) in order to
avoid multicollinearity with regressors.
21results obtained by using these two alternative measures of institutional quality
con￿rm robustly our hypothesis. Institutional quality seems to play a crucial
role in the speed by which the technology gap is closed by followers and, also, it
is a promoting factor of productivity growth per se. Interestingly, the baseline
results are then robust to di⁄erent speci￿cations and use of alternative proxies
for institutional quality. Even when the sample size increases quite considerably
the main results hold with very strong statistical signi￿cance. This is shown in
table 4.
Table 4 about here
7 Extensions of the model
7.1 Disaggregating institutions
Up to now we provided empirical evidence of the positive impact of overall
institutional quality on productivity growth. The e⁄ect of sound institutional
framework seems to work on two separate channels. On one hand, having higher
institutional quality fosters TFP growth per se by ensuring the adequate eco-
nomic environment conductive to productivity growth and technology creation
by innovation activities.
On the other hand better overall institutions enhance the transmission of
technology from the leaders to the followers. Empirical tests seem to show how
followers with good institutional frameworks are those experiencing a faster rate
of technology catch-up on the average.
As already argued before, however, we are interested in deepening the analy-
sis trying to discern which are the best policies and institutional arrangements
for technology di⁄usion and catch-up across countries and what their disjoint
impact may be. In particular, our theoretical framework (and previously men-
tioned contributions) argue for an ambigous e⁄ect of IPRs protection on pro-
ductivity growth since IPRs would act as a barrier to the free ￿ ow of technology
from the frontier (reducing productivity growth) but at the same time they
should incentivize the creation of innovation (increasing productivity growth).
Our empirical strategy will consist of estimating a modi￿cation of the base-
line speci￿cation in which the catch-up term will be built as the interaction
between the technology gap and each one of the institutional sub-categories
which compose the overall IQ index used in the previous section.
In the case of the EFW index we can decompose the IQ proxy into 5 main
sub-components: (1) Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enter-
prises, (2) Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, (3) Access to Sound
22Money, (4) Freedom to Trade Internationally and (5) Regulation of Credit, La-
bor, and Business. We then interact these "institutional aspects" with each
followers￿technological gap to test the role played by each one of these interac-
tions in promoting technology catch-up.
More formally we propose to estimate the following modi￿cation of eq.(19):



















i represents a vector of the 5 countries￿speci￿c institutional sub-
indexes taken in logs.
Also, following the hypothesis of our theoretical model we will check whether
there are substantial di⁄erences in the impact of each one of the institutional
sub-categories when countries are examined at di⁄erent stages of their economic
development.
For this reason, along with the analysis carried out over the whole sample,
we will also isolate the group of countries farther from the technological frontier
in order to check whether di⁄erences in the development stage actually imply
di⁄erences in the magnitude of the impact of, for instance, IPRs protection on
technology ￿ ows.
We de￿ne the group of followers by a measure of their relative development
stage proxied by the distance from the technological frontier in order to avoid a
priori sample grouping biases. Here we consider as "followers" all the countries
for which a technological gap from the U.S. is of 10% or more in the initial year.
This leads to a group of 35 followers and 15 leaders. Results are given in table
5.
Table 5 about here
In column (i) we propose the results of the IV estimations where all the
institutional sub-categories are inserted within the same regression along with
overall institutional quality in the BGP term of eq.(21). As expected, overall
institutional quality is again statistically signi￿cant in explaining cross-country
productivity growth rates per se.
Additionally, as suspected, when we disaggregate the institutional quality
index, some of the institutional sub-components do not seem to explain the
speed of the technology catching-up process. In particular, the results show
how cross-country di⁄erences in (1) Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes,
and Enterprises, and (5) Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business never enter
the regressions with signi￿cant coe¢ cients for whichever model speci￿cation and
23that, therefore, seem to be of negligible importance in explaining di⁄erences in
technology ￿ ows across countries.
Interestingly, our empirical investigation points to three major institutional
arrangements as being fundamental in the process of technology cacth-up across
countries. These are (i) " Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights"31,
(ii) "Freedom to trade internationally"32 and (iii) " Access to sound money"33.
The most striking result is shown for the variable proxying for Legal Struc-
ture and Security of Property Rights. Once we control for the overall IQ of a
country, a tightening of property rights protection seems to reduce the speed of
technology adoption both for the "All" and for the "Followers" samples. The
coe¢ cient for the variable capturing the interaction between the distance from
the technology frontier and the enforcement of property rights enters with a
positive sign (in the logistic formulation meaning a negative elasticity on TFP
growth). This coe¢ cient is estimated to be statistically signi￿cant at 1 percent
con￿dence levels. Our point estimates show how, ceteris paribus, an increase of
1 percent in the enforcement of property rights, as measured in the EFW index,
will reduce the rate of technology adoption by a value in between 2 percent (for
the whole sample) and 4 percent (for the followers￿group).
The di⁄erence between the magnitude of the estimated IPRs coe¢ cient for
the All sample and for that of the Followers is providing evidence that, as
hypothesized in the theoretical model, stronger IPRs regimes are going to act
as a barrier to the free ￿ ow of technologies especially for those countries which
are farther from the frontier and for which technology spillover usually take the
form of pure technological imitation.
Our result comes as an indirect con￿rmation of the evidence by Kwan and
Lai (2003) , Grossman and Lai (2004) and Connolly and Valderrama (2005) who
argue how, when the transmission of technology works through the imitation
channel, an increase in the protection of intellectual property rights may end
up reducing the speed of technology adoption. Ceteris paribus within the same
economy, the enforcement of IPRs implies a trade-o⁄ between the positive in-
centive given to the R&D sector and the negative e⁄ect coming from an increase
in the cost of imitation.
31This index is an average of: (i) Judicial independence, (ii) Impartial courts, (iii) Protection
of intellectual property rights, (iv) Military interference in the rule of law, (v) Integrity of legal
system (rule of law) which are all expected to control for the extent to which property rights
are ensured within an economy.
32This index is an average of 5 minor sub-categories: (i) Taxes on international trade, (ii)
Regulatory trade barriers, (iii) Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size, (iv)
Di⁄erence between o¢ cial exchange rate and black market rate, (v) International capital
market controls.
33This index is an average of: (i) Average annual growth of money supply, (ii) Standard
in￿ation variability during last ￿ve years, (iii) Recent in￿ation rate, (iv) Freedom to own
foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad.
24Countries closer to the technological frontier will be less harmed by a tight-
ening of property rights than the followers since the innovative e⁄ort in these
countries is very low. In this situation economic and political interests usually
opt for weak protection of IPRs. As income and technical capabilities increase
at higher development stages, the impact of tighter IPRs become less and less
detrimental since demand shifts towards higher-quality products and innovative
activities become predominant.
Column (ii) in table 5 also shows a positive impact over the TFP catching-
up process of the variable "Access to sound money" which proxies for In￿ ation
controls and sound macroeconomic framework in each country. The economic
intuition behind this result is that high and unpredictable in￿ ation rates dras-
tically rise the risks of doing business and internal and external trade may be
signi￿cantly hampered.34
Finally, "Freedom to trade internationally" and all the policy arrangements
which enhance trade openness are shown to be bene￿cial for economic growth
and productivity catch-up. The coe¢ cient for the variable capturing trade open-
ness is signi￿cant for the group of followers in our sample. As pointed out, for
instance, by Alcal￿ and Ciccone (2004) or Dollar and Kraay (2003) there exists a
positive relationship between good institutions, openness to trade and growth35.
Also the work of Sachs and Warner (1995) shows how open, but still developing,
countries are found to grow by 4.5% per year in the 1970s and 1980s, that is, 4
percentage points more than their closed counterparts.
Hence, from the perspective of technology catching-up analysis, the positive
e⁄ect of trade on the growth of productivity is expected to be especially true for
follower countries since opening up to trade may allow some signi￿cant reverse
engineering and faster technology imitation36. This is actually the result we get
in our estimates and that con￿rms the evidence of other studies such as Falvey
et al. (2002). The coe¢ cient for trade openness is statistically signi￿cant at 1%
con￿dence level for the sub-sample of followers.
34From a technology catching-up perspective, the costs of high in￿ation levels on produc-
tivity ￿ows from leaders to followers might negatively work through the reduction of FDI and
internal investments in those countries experiencing in￿ation crisis. This result is highlighted
by many empirical works such as Fischer (1993), Levine and Renelt (1992) or Rogo⁄ and
Reinhart (2003). This result is stronger for the whole sample speci￿cation while it is not sig-
ni￿cant for the group of followers where, as mentioned, technology spillovers may be assuming
the form of technology imitation rather than that of adoption.
35Countries that trade more are those which more bene￿t from technological spillovers and
therefore tend to grow faster than others ultimately being more productive. This result holds
both for the innovative and imitative sectors.
36We claim that the positive impact of trade on productivity growth may especially true for
developing countries due to the fact that usually this result holds in very large samples where
the share of developing countries over developed ones is very high. Also, Alcal￿ and Ciccone
(2002) show how trade and institutional quality have a positive and statistically robust impact
on GDP growth when the sample is restricted to former colonies (which are usually developing
countries). With the same result the work of Dollar (1992) for a sample of 95 LDCs.
257.2 Isolating IPRs and Trade e⁄ects
A stronger protection of property rights not only reduces the rate of technology
adoption but, at the same time, it increases the overall institutional quality of
a country. The e⁄ect, as already pointed out is then ambigous on the creation
and adoption of technology especially for follower countries.
The reasoning is instead di⁄erent for the Trade Openness institutional proxy.
In follower countries we showed that Trade Openness works as an enhancing fac-
tor for technology adoption following the idea that, by trading, least developed
countries may do more reverse engineering and have more incentive to imitation
since they will eventually sell the "copies" in international markets. Also, trade
openness is going to positively a⁄ect the creation of innovation by increasing
competition pressure. Its e⁄ect, then, di⁄erently from that of IPRs protection
is unambigously positive.
Since these two institutional aspects seems to be rather fundamental, we are
here interested in isolating their impact from that of the other IQ sub-categories.
We build a composite institutional index which only takes into account the role
played by trade and IPRs protection and re-run the estimates on these two
channels only. We present the result in table 6
Table 6 about here
Results seem to con￿rm the hypothesis that IPRs protection and Trade
Openness act as major determinants of technology catch-up. Both variables
enter with the the expected sign and with a statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient.
Crucially, again, their e⁄ect is stronger in the follower sub-sample as we would
expect with the partial e⁄ect of a tightening of IPRs reducing the rate of tech-
nology adoption while trade openness instead increases technology ￿ ows.
8 Institutional threshold analysis
As proposed by Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), once the empirical model in eq.
(19) has been estimated it is possible, within the logistic di⁄usion formaliza-
tion, to compute the minimum institutional level below which followers will not
theoretically catch-up with the frontier accordingly to the model.
Our point estimates for the logistic di⁄usion of technology given in ￿gure
1 imply an insitutional threshold value of 5.18 (on a potential scale from 0 to
10 with the U.S. scoring 7.8). In our case, those countries with an average in-
stitutional quality below 0.66% w.r.t. the leader will theoretically fall behind
without catching up. Out of the 50 countries examined 15 experience an insti-
tutional level lower than the estimated threshold. These are Ghana, Nigeria,
26Bangladesh, Brazil, Tanzania, Burundi, Malawi, Peru, Turkey, Argentina, Is-
rael ,Pakistan, India Mali and Morocco. Out of these, only Turkey, Israel and
India experience a positive TFP growth while the others, experiencing negative
productivity growth, are clearly diverging from the leader.
The distance from the threshold experienced by Argentina, India, Israel and
Turkey is however small. This points to the fact that with even moderate
institutional improvements these countries may invert their diverging patterns.
For the other countries, instead, major improvements in institutional quality
seem to be required in order to be pushed out from a self locking divergence club.
The overall picture, nonetheless, seems to point to cross-country convergence
and catch up with some cases of self locked diverging countries.
As an additional robustness check we use the computed gap from the IQ
threshold level as a regressor for TFP growth both for the All and Followers
sub-sample ￿nding that the more a country is found above the IQ threshold
level and the higher will be its TFP growth rate. We also regress the TFP
growth di⁄erentials among the U.S. and all the followers on the distance from
the IQ estimated threshold level for each country ￿nding how those countries
above the threshold level are actually catching-up with the frontier.
Table 7 about here
9 Conclusions
The paper addressed the issue of technological catching-up across countries by
focusing on the role of institutional quality. Di⁄erences in institutional quality
across countries are found to be of crucial importance in explaining the speed
of technology ￿ ows from leaders to followers. Empirical estimates show how
institutional quality acts as an enhancing factor for technology transfers from
the world frontier to the laggards allowing the latters to theoretically catch-up
with the leaders. Instead, countries lagging behind the technological level of the
leader and, at the same time, owning poor institutions are showed to experience
relatively lower GDP and productivity growth rates.
Overall institutional quality is not only found to be of importance in deter-
mining technology transfer from the leader to the follower. Also, having good
institutional quality acts as a promoting factor for the technological innovation
of an economy per se. This result has already been established by a variety of
models and empirical works where TFP growth rates are found to be highly
correlated to good institutions.
We observe evidence of ￿-convergence in our sample. This, noticeably, seems
to be driven by the process of technology catch up highlighted in our framework.
27In particular, when we account for possibility of technology catch up, the nega-
tive coe¢ cient associated to the initial levels of GDP changes its sign to positive
implying a fundamental role of technology catch up within the ￿-convergence
process.
Following a recent strand of literature opened by Acemoglu, Aghion and
Zilibotti (2006) or Aghion and Howitt (2005) we analyzed the di⁄erent impact
that the same institutional arrangements may have on countries di⁄erring in
their development stage.
In particular, IPRs protection is found to exert an ambigous e⁄ect on pro-
ductivity growth by, on one hand, incentivizing the creation of new technology
and, on the other hand, slowing down the pace of technology adoption from
the frontier. This assumption has been formalized into a growth model ￿ la
Romer (1990) which also exploits some of the features of the empirical model
of Behnabib and Spiegel (2005).
In our basic assumption, enforcing property rights boosts the innovative
activity by raising overall institutional quality and raising TFP growth rates.
However, when property rights are tightened followers ￿nd more di¢ cult to
imitate technologies discovered elsewhere due to a relative increase in the costs
of imitation. Empirical results show how IPRs protection statistically decreases
the speed by which followers are going to adopt technology from the frontier.
This is especially true for those countries lagging farther from the frontier while,
the positive incentives to the R&D of a tightening of IPRs are stronger for those
countries closer to the technological frontier.
Our empirical results provide robust evidence to the hypothesis that some
institutions may enhance (or inhibit) economic growth depending on the de-
velopment stage of the country and their e⁄ect may in fact ambigous. This is
especially true in a context where countries can grow either by innovation or by
technology imitation.
Theoretical and empirical literature point to openness to trade as another
fundamental institutional arrangement fostering technology adoption. Our em-
pirical result con￿rm this hypothesis. More open countries are growing faster on
average by exploiting the technology catch-up mechanism. On the sub-sample
of followers which are found farther from the frontier both the Trade and IPRs
e⁄ects are stronger as the theoretical model would predict.
Finally, we showed how, by assuming that technologies are adopted through
a s-shaped logistic di⁄usion curve some restrictive catching-up conditions arise.
We adapt the Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) framework so as to de￿ne a minimum
institutional level below which followers do not theoretically catch-up. Out of
the 50 countries examined for the period in between 1970 and 2000, 15 are
found below the theoretical institutional threshold. These countries experience a
28decline in productivity over the period and therefore diverging from the frontier.
The distance from the estimated institutional threshold level is shown also to
be a strong predictor of TFP growth di⁄erentials.
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0.074 0.084 0.555 1
30Table 2:     IV estimates of eq. (14)
Logistic diffusion function

















































n. Obs 50 50 50
***, ** Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5%
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and reported  in parenthesis.
Ln IQ represents log of average institutional quality over the period 1970-2000.
TFP gap represents the  ratio of each country’s TFP initial level to U.S as TFPi/TFPm
Instruments: (i)Fraction of population speaking English (ii) Fraction of population speaking
one of the 6 major European languages, (iii) Latitude, (iv) Years open to Trade as specified in
the text.
31Table 3:  IV estimates of eq. (14)
Confined exponential diffusion function















Ln Ypp 1970 -0.000
(0.00)
Ln invest.Rate 1970 0.010
(0.004)***


















n. Obs 50 50
***, ** Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5%
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and reported  in parenthesis.
Ln IQ represents log of average institutional quality over the period 1970-2000.
TFP gap represents the  ratio of each country’s TFP initial level to U.S as TFPi/TFPm
Instruments: (i)Fraction of population speaking English (ii) Fraction of population
speaking one of the 6 major European languages, (iii) Latitude, (iv) Years open to Trade as
specified in the text. .
Instruments: (i)Fraction of population speaking English (ii) Fraction of population
speaking one of the 6 major European languages, (iii) Latitude, (iv) Years open to Trade as
specified in the text.
32Table 4:    IV estimates of eq. (14)
on Social Infrastructure and GADP indexes
Logistic diffusion function






Ln Social Infrastr. 0.031
(0.08)***




Ln GADP*TFP gap -0.01
(0.002)***

























n. Obs 97 97
***, ** Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5%
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and reported  in parenthesis
Social Infrastructures and GADP (Government Anti-Diversion Policy) indexes are taken
from Hall and Jones (1999).
TFP gap represents the  ratio of each country’s TFP initial level to U.S as TFPi/TFPm
Instruments: (i)Fraction of population speaking English (ii) Fraction of population
speaking one of the 6 major European languages, (iii) Latitude, (iv) Years open to Trade as
specified in the text.
33Table 5:     IV estimates of eq. (16)
on “All” and “Followers” sample
Logistic diffusion function
Dependent Variable: Annual TFP growth 1970-2000
ALL ALL Followers Followers

























































































n. Obs 50 50 35 35
***, ** Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5%
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and reported  in parenthesis.
Ln IQ represents log of average institutional quality over the period 1970-2000.
TFP gap represents the  ratio of each country’s TFP initial level to U.S as TFPi/TFPm
Instruments: (i)Fraction of population speaking English (ii) Fraction of population speaking one of
the 6 major European languages, (iii) Latitude, (iv) Years open to Trade as specified in the text.
#Latitude has been eliminated from  the instrumental set since not truly orthogonal to the error
process.
34Table 6:     IPRs and Trade catch-up effect
Dependent Variable: Annual TFP growth 1970-2000
ALL ALL Followers Followers







































n. Obs 50 50 35 35
***, **,* Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals
Instruments: Engfrac, Eurfrac, Latitude, Years open to Trade
Followers are defined as all countries with a distance from the leader as 10% or more in
the level of productivity in the initial year.  Standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity
35Table 7:     Threshold analysis



















R2 .28 .37 .28
Obs. 50 35 50
***, **,* Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
OLS estimates
References
[1] Abramovitz, M. (1986). ￿Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling. Be-
hind￿ . Journal of Economic History 46, 385-406.
[2] Acemoglu D., S. Johnson and J. Robinson (2001). "The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation", American Eco-
nomic Review 91, 1369-1401.
[3] Acemoglu D., S. Johnson and J. Robinson (2005). "Institutions as the Fun-
damental Cause of Long-Run Growth", in Aghion P. and S. Durlauf (eds),
Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier.
[4] Acemoglu D., P. Aghion and F. Zilibotti (2006). "Distance to Frontier,
Selection, and Economic Growth", Journal of the European Economic As-
sociation 4 (1), 37-74
[5] Alcal￿, F. and A. Ciccone (2004). ￿Trade and Productivity￿ . Quarterly
Journal of Economics 119, 613-646.
[6] Aghion P. et al. (2005). "The Unequal E⁄ects of Liberalization: Evidence
from Dismantling the License Raj in India". NBER working paper.
[7] Aghion P., Harris C. and Vickers J. (1997) "Competition and Growth with
Step-by-Step Innovation; An Example", European Economic Review 41,
771-782.
36[8] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt, (1992). ￿A Model of Growth Through Creative
Destruction￿Econometrica 60 (2), 323-351.
[9] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (2005) "Appropriate Growth Policy,". Forthcom-
ing in the Journal of the European Economic Association.
[10] Baier S. L., Dwyer G. P. and Tamura R. (2006). ￿How Important are
Capital and Total Factor Productivity for Economic Growth?￿ , Economic
Enquiry 44(1), 23-49.
[11] Bailey, M. and H. Gersbach (1995). "E¢ ciency in manufacturing and the
need for global competition", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 307-
347
[12] Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin. (1995). "Economic Growth", McGraw-Hill.
[13] Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin. (1997). ￿Technological Di⁄u-
sion,Convergence and Growth,￿Journal of Economic Growth 1, 1-26
[14] Barro R. and J. Lee. (1993). "International comparisons of educational
attainment," Journal of Monetary Economics 32(3), 363-394
[15] Basu, S. and J. Fernald. (1997). "Returns to scale in U.S. Production.
Estimates and Implications". Journal of Political Economy 105, 249-283.
[16] Basu, S. and M. Kimball. (1997). ￿Cyclical Productivity with Unobserved
Input Variation.￿NBER Working Paper 5915.
[17] Basu, S., J. Fernald and M. Kimball. (1998). ￿Are technology improvements
contractionary?￿ . International Finance Discussion Paper 625, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System
[18] Basu, Susanto, and David N. Weil, (1998), ￿Appropriate Technology and
Growth,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 113(4), 1025-54.
[19] Benhabib, J. and M. Spiegel. (1994). ￿The Role of Human Capital in Eco-
nomic Development: Evidence from Aggregate Cross-Country Data,￿Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics 34, 143-173.
[20] Benhabib, J. and M. Spiegel. (2005). "Human Capital and Technology Dif-
fusion", in Aghion P. and S. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth,
Elsevier
[21] Bils, M. and P. Klenow. (2000)- ￿Does Schooling Cause Growth?,￿Ameri-
can Economic Review 90(5), 1160-83.
[22] Boldrin, M. and Levine, D. (2005) "Against Intellectual Monopoly", Cam-
bridge University Press
[23] Caselli F. (2005). "Accounting for Cross-Country Income Di⁄erences," in
Aghion P. and S. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier.
37[24] Connolly M. and D. Valderrama. (2005). "North-South technological di⁄u-
sion and dynamic gains from trade," Working Papers in Applied Economic
Theory, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
[25] Cherchye L. and W. Moesen. (2002). "Institutional Infrastructure and Eco-
nomic Performance: Levels versus Catching Up and Frontier Shifts," Public
Economics Working Paper Series, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum
voor Economische Studiºn, Working Group Public Economics.
[26] Coe, D. and E. Helpman. (1995). ￿International R&D Spillovers,￿European
Economic Review 39(5), 859-87
[27] de la Fuente A, DomØnech R. (2006), "Human capital in growth regression.
How much di⁄erence does data quality make?". Journal of the European
Economic Association 4(1), 1-36.
[28] Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2003). ￿Institutions, trade, and growth￿Journal
of Monetary Economics 50(1), 133-162
[29] Easterly W. and R. Levine. (2001). "It￿ s Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized
Facts and Growth Models"- World Bank Economic Review, 15, 177-219.
[30] Economic Freedom of the World index, http://www.fraserinstitute.ca.
[31] Falvey, R., Greenaway, D. and Foster, N. (2002) "North-south trade knowl-
edge spillovers and growth". Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 17,
pp.650-670.
[32] Fischer S. (1993). ￿The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth,￿Journal
of Monetary Economics 32, 485-511
[33] Frankel J. and D. Romer, (1999), ￿Does Trade cause Growth? ￿ . American
Economic Review 89(3), 379-99.
[34] Gallini, N. (1992) "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation", The RAND Jour-
nal of Economics 23, 52-63
[35] Gerschenkron A. (1962). Economic backwardness in historical perspective:
Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
[36] Ginarte J.C. and Park W.C. (1997) "Determinants of patent rights: A
cross-national study". Research Policy, 26, 283-301.
[37] Grossman G. and E. Lai (2004) "International Protection of Intellectual
Property". American Economic Review 94, 1635-1653.
[38] Hall, R. and C. Jones. (1999). ￿Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much
More Output Per Worker Than Others?,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics
114(1), 83-116
38[39] Helpman, E. (1993). ￿Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property
Rights,￿Econometrica 61, 1247-80.
[40] Jones C. (1995), ￿R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth￿ Journal of
Political Economy 103, 759￿ 784
[41] Levin, R., et al. (1988), "Appropriating the returns from Industrial R&D",
Working paper, Cowles foundation, Yale University
[42] Levine, R. and D. Renelt. (1992). "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country
Growth Regressions," American Economic Review, American Economic
Association. 82(4), 942-63
[43] Kaufmann D., andKraay A., (2002) "Growth without governance," Policy
Research Working Paper Series 2928, The World Bank
[44] Kaufmann D., Kraay A. and P. Zoido-Lobat￿n. (1999) ￿Aggregating Gov-
ernance Indicators￿ , World Bank Working Paper
[45] Klenow, P., and A. Rodriguez-Clare. (1997). ￿The Neoclassical Revival in
Growth Economics: Has It Gone Too Far?,￿ N.B.E.R. Macroeconomics
Annual, 73-103.
[46] Keefer P. and S. Knack. (1997). "Why Don￿ t Poor Countries Catch Up?
A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation". Economic Inquiry
35, 590-602.
[47] Keefer P. and S. Knack (2002). " Polarization, Politics and Property Rights:
Links Between Inequality and Growth", Public Choice 111, 127-154.
[48] Kwan Y. and E. Lai (2003). " Intellectual Property Rights Protection and
Endogenous Economic Growth".Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol 27, 853-873.
[49] Kumar S. and R. Russell (2002), ￿Technological Change, Technological
Catch-up, and Capital Deepening: Relative contributions to Growth and
Convergence.￿American Economic Review 92, 527-548.
[50] Maskus, K. (2000). "Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Develop-
ment," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law special Supple-
ment 32(2), 471-500.
[51] Nelson, R. and E. Phelps. (1966). ￿Investment in Humans, Technological
Di⁄usion, and Economic Growth,￿American Economic Review 56, 69-75.
[52] Olson M., N. Sarna and A. Swamy. (2000).￿Governance and Growth: A
Simple Hypothesis Explaining Cross Country Di⁄erences in Productivity
Growth￿ , Public Choice, 102, 341-364
[53] Parente, S., and E. Prescott. (2000). Barriers to Riches, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
39[54] Prescott, E. (1998). "Needed: A Theory of Total Factor Productivity,"
International Economic Review, 39(3), 525-551.
[55] Rogo⁄ K. and C. Reinhart. (2003). "FDI to Africa: The Role of Price
Stability and Currency Instability," IMF Working Papers
[56] Romer, P. (1990). ￿Endogenous Technical Change,￿ Journal of Political
Economy 98, 71-102.
[57] Sachs, J. and A. Warner. (1997). ￿Fundamental Sources of Long-Run
Growth,￿ . American Economic Review 87(2), 184-188.
[58] Solow, R.M., (1956) ￿A contribution to the theory of economic growth,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 70(1): 65-94.
[59] Staiger, D. and J. Stock. (1997). ￿Instrumental variables regression with
weak instruments.￿Econometrica 65(3), 557-86.
40